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ON THE STRUCTURE OF A CIVIL CODE 
ALAIN LEVASSEUR* 
INTRODUCTION 
The civil code has always been for the civil lawyer one of those 
rich fertile fields in which one can, with some intelligence, reflection 
and shrewdness, harvest the fruits of one's creative efforts. 
Harvests seem to be endless: they appear more and more beautiful 
and elaborate, so much so that the instrument one handles, the 
tool that helps to engender so many highly sophisticated intellec­
tual works, is relegated to the background. We should like here 
to lean for a little while on this instrument, on its outlook or its 
shape, on its formal structure, rather than on its intellectual con­
tent. We thereby hope to honor the memory of our deeply revered 
professor and prominent colleague, Clarence J. Morrow, whose 
skill, dexterity and perfect knowledge of the Louisiana Civil Code 
had always been a subject of wonder and admiration on the part 
of his students and fellow scholars. 
SCOPE OF A CODE 
Just as there are certain guidelines to which an architect must 
adhere when drawing his master plans, so too, the structural 
organization of a code is not left to hazard. It was necessary at the 
outset to limit its scope so that it would not infringe upon legal 
questions that do not belong to its essence, whether it be a civil, 
criminal, or commercial code. Therefore, the drafters of the "civil 
code" first had to agree on what they meant by "civil code." Once 
this agreement was reached, all the substance of what was to become 
the civil code had to be organized following a plan that would lend 
itself to fiexibility--one offering many alternatives. A choice having 
been made as to which alternative was the best, it remained to 
classify, within the plan previously adopted, the articles which 
would reproduce the whole substance of the "civil" code. 
To a common law lawyer, and may I venture to say to a great 
many civil law lawyers, the meaning of the word "civil" is either 
unknown or unclear. Let us not blame them since a precise and 
indisputable definition of the word would be impossible to give in 
view of the fact that the meaning of the word has varied greatly 
in the history of law. In Roman law, "civil" law was opposed to 
"natural" law, or, in other words, the civil law was the positive 
* Assistant Professor, Tulane University School of Law (on leave of 
absence). 
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law the law enacted by the people and even more precisely, by the 
peo�le of one city. The most acceptable sense of the word is indi­
cated by Gaius when he writes "The law that each people has given 
to itself ... is its own and is called 'civil law,' that is to say the law 
proper to the city."1 In this sense therefore, "the civil law of the 
Romans is the compendium of all the laws of their city."2 There is 
no doubt that in our civil law systems of today the meaning of the 
word "civil" has undergone a considerable limitation, since it 
refers only to that part of the law that governs the relations of 
men with one another. This limitation of the scope of the word 
finds its explanation in the history of Rome, the fall of the Roman 
Empire, and the second revival of Roman law in Europe in the 
late sixteenth century. 
Of the Roman laws which became the written reason of 
Europe, only those laws dealing with family, successions 
and contracts were selected. All that was concerned with the 
government, the police, administration and the military had 
become too foreign to what then existed to be adopted. The 
habit developed of giving the name of civil law exclusively 
to that part of Roman law that governed the personal in­
terests of the citizens. As a consequence the words "civil 
law" no longer had so extensive a meaning as they had in 
the past. Thus there resulted in our modern days this division 
between different codes of the different kinds of laws accord­
ing to the various things they deal with.a 
It is this last meaning of the word "civil" that prevailed in the 
days when the French Civil Code, and later the Louisiana Civil 
Code, were drafted. The scope of the civil code was thus limited 
to those matters having to do with the relations between men. Yet 
these matters were so numerous as to impose the necessity of 
organizing them into a coherent frame. In their search for such 
a frame, the drafters of the code could rely heavily on the teachings 
and experience of the past before they decided on one alternative 
or another. 
TEACHINGS AND EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST 
. 
How many Louisiana lawyers have asked themselves the ques­
ho
i_i : ':hy three books in the civil code? Nothing, a priori, seems 
to Justify such a distribution, and it is  well known that when the 
1 Gaius Institutes 1.1.1: 
voc����u�
u'ft,;u�Jiz'fulus �p�e sibi iu.s con�t�tui�, id ipsius proprium est 
(Auth , t I . , quasi JUB proprium civitatis. ors rans ation.) The word" · .1,, h . . . . . . . (citizen) and civ 't . 't . . civi as its or1gm m the Latin words civis ., i as, civi atis (city). - 6 P. Fenet Recueil Complet d T , . . . 68 (1827) (author' t 1 t' 
es .ravaux Preparatoires sur le Code C1VII 
a J Portali D� 
rans a rnn) [hereinafter cited as Fenet]. 
(F. Po�talis ed 8'184�)co
u
(
rs,th
Rappot
rts et '!ravaux Inedits sur le Code Civil 86 
· au or s ranslation). 
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four drafters of the Code Civil4 started working on their code, 
there had been no previous discussion as to the division of the code 
into three books. There is no doubt that the weight of Roman law 
forced the hazard of the choice, if hazard there was. In fact, the 
plan can be traced back to Gaius and his Institutes. 
The plan of these Institutes is built around three titles, and all 
the rules of civil law are gathered under them. "Omne autem jus 
quo utimur vel ad personas pertinet, vel ad res, vel ad actiones."r> 
Thus, according to Gaius, all the law that we use belongs either to 
persons or to things or to actions. There seems to be no earlier 
legal work with such a division into three parts, and one can think 
that Gaius fathered it and that Justinian simply borrowed it.6 
However, until the end of the sixteenth century, the plan of  Jus­
tinian's Institutes had very little influence, and Domat ignored it 
completely in his famous treatise.7 In Domat's opinion, the most 
natural division is that which consists in distinguishing the legal 
ties that men create in their everyday lives from those they inherit 
from their fathers by succession. This division by Domat illustrates 
a collective approach to private law, whereas the essence of the 
latter is to be individualistic, and for that reason, it is believed 
that Domat's classification has had no influence at all on jurists. 
Among the other works which were written from the time of the 
second revival of Roman law until the late 1870's8 and which show 
a strong influence on the plan of the Institutes, we must mention 
Pothier's treatise9 of 1670, which reproduced the division between 
persons, things and actions, and Bourjon's work10 of 1747. 
ORGANIZATION OF A CODE 
One could say that there is no book, either in the Louisiana 
Civil Code or in the Code Civil, on the matter of actions, but rather 
4 See Levasseur, Code Napoleon or C ode Portalis?, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 762-66 
(1969). 
5 Gaius Institutes 1.2.8. See also Justinian Institutes 1.2.12; Digest 1.5.1; 
De Jure Naturale 1.2. 
6 R. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law 38 (1944): 
The first Book will tell us what are the principal classes of persons 
known to Roman Law This is the Law relating to Persons. The next 
section, comprising in Gaius Books II a�d Ill an� in Justinian Books II 
and III and Titles I to V of Book IV, will deal with the substance of the 
Law. This is the Law relating to Things. r:fhe last section, c�mprising in 
Gaius the whole and in Justinian the remainder of Book IV, is concerned 
principally with procedure. This is the Law relating to Actions. 
7 J. Domat Les Lois Civiles dans Leur Ordre Nature! (1694) . 
s See Haurlou, Note sur rlnftuence Exercee PM les Institutes en Matiere 
de Classification du Droit, 7 Rev. Crit. de Leg. et _de Jur. 373 (1887). 
9 R. Pothier, Introduction a la Coutume d'Orleans (1670). 
10 F. Bourjon, Le Droit Commun de la France et la Coutume de Paris 
Reduite en Principes (1747). Bourjon adopted the general classification of the 
Institutes but devoted one book to the law of persons, four books to the law 
' 
. 
of things, and one book to the law of actions. 
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a third book on the modes of acquiring the owner
ship of things. 
There lies, indeed, a very important difference betw
een our modern 
works and those of Gaius and Justinian. One half of 
what was 
encompassed in the third book of the Institutes has be
en trans­
ferred, in our codes, to the book on "persons" and the oth
er half 
has been included in the Code of Civil Procedure. In the law
 of 
the Institutes, obligations were inserted between "things" 
and 
"actions" and belonged to both categories.11 It was s o  because 
at 
Roman law obligations were considered not as a mode of acquiring 
ownership, but simply as a preliminary step towards acquisition, 
which was completed only by traditio or actual transfer of the 
thing. This has changed since the courts and tribunals of the Ancien 
Regime which effected a drastic change in the consequences of the 
obligation "to give" by holding i t  to be sufficient of its own accord 
to achieve the transfer and acquisition of ownership. Such is the 
meaning of Louisiana Civil Code a rticle 870,12 the first article of 
Book III, and a title by itself (which stresses the i mportance of 
its provision), and article 1907,13 which points out the difference 
from the law of the Institutes. Obligations, therefore, had to be 
separated from res and actiones to become part of a new thirp 
book, due to take the place of the then disrupted book on "actions." 
This tripartite division was adopte d  by the drafters of the French 
Code as a natural heritage of a juridicial tradition. Maleville14 tells 
us that such a divisio:i;i was agreed upon without any adverse 
opinion, although he admits that it is far from being the best.15 This 
division into three parts was thus not rested upon fully convincing 
justifications. 
�ub�idiary to the main question of tripartite division is th�t of 
settmg m order the topics of the three books. Why have "persons" 
been placed before "things," and why have the latter been placed 
11 Compa J t' · I · . re us. mian nst1tutes 2.2.2, where obligations are made part of reartmcforpo;ales, with Digest 44.7 and Code 4.10 where obligations are made 
pa o act1ones. 
' 
12 La. Civil Code art. 870 (1870): 
lega1
h
o
e
r 
o;;��ship�f t�ngs
h
or property is acquired by inheritance either 
of law. 
men ry, Y t e effect of obligations, and by the operation 
13 La. Civi� Co?e art. 1907 (1870) : 
ke
�
;i
�� j�1���!:0:n�
� fii�id�lf�
c�del .\�a{
h
of delivering the thing, and. of 
being liable, on failure to pay
e
d 
0 1 • 
t 
e person who �ontracts to gwe 
contracted. 
' amages 0 the person WJ.th whom he has 
H Jacque de Maleville one of th f d f secretary to the dr afti'ng 'c 
. . e our ra ters of the Code Civil, was also 1� omm1ss1on. 
1 J. de Maleville Analyse R · , d 1 . . Conseil d'f:tat ( 3d ed fa22) M 1 �
isonn�e e a Discussion du Code Civil au 
the three books of the Cod
· � �ville points out the want of balance between 
�icles; third book, 15ll a
�
ic
f::i�nfirst book, 515 .articles; second book, 195 
lJl the Louisiana Civil Code· first b 
;v:�4mor� obvious want of balance exists 
third book, 2700 articles. 
· 00 ' articles; second book, 409 articles; 
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before the modes of acquiring them? Such an order is often taken 
for granted and does not appeal to the curiosity of the reader. 
There is, however, a logic and an explanation behind this taken-for­
granted presentation. There would not be any law in the absence of 
a human being to create it, a human being to benefit from it  or to 
suffer under it. Natural sense and logic command that persons be 
considered before the things they will own, or benefit from, or suffer 
from. And things should be dealt with before the modes of acquiring 
them-establishing the kind of legal ties men can create with things 
requires that the latter be defined first. Lastly, things becoming the 
objects of transactions between men, the third book should log­
ically define these various transactions and enumerate the rights 
they generate.16 
This problem of organizing the code, putting it into order, was 
the least difficult that the drafters of the civil code had to face in 
their immense work. In fact, this was done as the last matter and 
did not raise many difficulties. The hard core of the work was 
the actual writing of the articles themselves. There, indeed, lay 
the mammoth work. "A code is not the arbitrary and spontaneous 
product of a legislative thought in the process of enacting. A code 
sums up in its provisions the results achieved by the labor of 
reason in the past centuries."17 The redactors of codes "adopt what 
has been given to us by the general legal culture. But not every­
thing can be adopted, adapted to the needs of the State that expects 
this 'important codification.' It is necessary to create many new 
legal rules: codification cannot be' a compilation."18 Codification is 
an art that obeys some stringent rules. 
These rules concern the methods of expression, taken in a large 
sense, and the intellectual mechanism that permits one to find his 
way through the code. As regards the methods of expression, many 
remarks of more or less deep implication could be made, but we 
shall limit ourselves to the style of the articles, their various 
grammatical natures, and the institutions of the civil code. 
THE ARTICLES: THEIR STYLE AND NATURE 
One cannot but be struck by the bluntness, rigidity, abstract­
ness and coldness of the style of the code articles, but this is by 
no means peculiar to only the French and Louisiana Civil Codes. 
A look at the German or Swiss Civil Codes is enough to convince 
us that such a style is proper to any civil code. Bonaparte, however, 
16 An interesting analysis of the order of the Code Civil can be found in 
M. de Chassat Trait.e de !'Interpretation des Lois (1822). 
11 1 T. Hdc, Commentaire Tbeorique et Pratique du Code Civil 87 (1892) 
(author's translation). 
. • . 
. 
. . . 1s Golab Theori.e et Technique de la Codification, m Studi F1losofico-G1un-
dici Dedicatf a Giorgio del Vecchio 296 (author's translation). · 
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was utterly critical of this style: "The vice of our modern legisla­
tions is that they do not speak to imagination. Man can be gov­
erned only by imagination; without it, man is a brute. It is a mis­
take to govern men like things; it is by speaking to man's soul 
that he can be thrilled .... "19 Despite the truth that one can find 
in this statement, the technicians who wrote the code articles 
wanted to appeal neither to man's imagination nor to his feelings. 
They were convinced of the impossibility of parrying technicality 
for the reason that there is a language of the laws which warrants 
its adaptability and pliability. "The law (la loi), wh ich has neither 
eyes nor ears, should be able to be modified where equity requires 
it, following the circumstances and the inconveniences i t  creates in 
particular cases."20 The history of the broadening of article 1372 
of the Code Civil and article 2295 of the Louisiana Civil Code is 
highly illustrative of this necessity. How much more could be said 
of article 1384 of the Code Civil and articles 2317-2318 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code?21 Thus, technicality of the language of the 
articles will ensure their stability, and therefore their prestige, 
because they are made of special words deprived of their common 
and popular meaning. The words are, in a sense, "juridicalized," 
taken out of the real and the palpable to be shaped into an abstract 
concept. There lies the true originality, almost the mystery, of the 
code articles. The code articles that formulate definitions of legal 
concepts illustrate very well the style of the code. 
Remembering the well-known warning of the Digest, that 
"omnis definitio in jure periculosa," the drafters of the Code Civil 
did their best to evade the difficult task of drafting too many defi­
nitions. This care was clearly stated by Portalis, speaking on be­
half of his colleagues in the commission: 
The general definitions for the most part include only 
vague and abstract expressions, whose meaning is often 
more difficult to determine than the meaning of the thing 
itself
. 
that is defined. . . . All that is definition, teaching, 
doctrme, belongs to the domain of science. All that is order, 
rule-properly so called-belongs to the domain of laws. 22 
.
.
. 
The civil code has grown older, life has undergone deep social 
and material changes, but together they have worked toward 
C 
19 
.Thiba�deau, Memoires sur le Consultat de 1799 a 1804 par un Ancien onse1ller d Etat 419-24 (author's translation) �� �· P�rtalis, quoted in
� Fenet, supra not� 2, at 33 (author's translation). 
R 
ee tone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Concept of Fault, 27 Tul. L. 
L!v. �· 1.£ (�9?2); see also the following works of G. Theall: Comment, Tort 
Re
� {�
9 
c°
i
�t��a
)
��h1 S
L
up
R
plementary Tort Articles 2817-2822, 44 Tul. L. 
;.. , u . •  ev. 907 (1969). 
� 6 Fenet, supra note 2, at 42 (author's translation). 
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changes in the courts' decisions, while still in agreement with the 
fixity of the words. The code has been written in such a way that 
it can be fashioned differently by contemporary judges administer­
ing justice in countries ruled by similar codes. 
All the code articles do not have the same force, the same value. 
Broadly speaking, the grammatical nature of the articles leads to 
a two-fold division of the provisions of the code: imperative or 
positive provisions, and suppletory or declaratory provisions.23 Im­
perative or positive provisions are those falling within the terms 
of article 2 of the Louisiana Civil Code.24 Each is an illustration of 
the obligation the legislator had to face, i.e., solve a conflict of in­
terests. A choice had to be made, and no option or choice could be 
left to the parties. An obligation is often expressed by the use of 
verbs25 such as "oblige,"26 "must,"27 or "to be bound to,"28 or, more 
frequently, "to be."29 It can also be expressed with an adjective or 
past participle such as "executed"30 or "responsible for."31 Supple­
tory or declaratory provisions are so called because they leave to the 
parties the option to decide otherwise. But, in the event they omit to 
do so, the suppletory provisions are brought in to fill the gap, to 
"supplement" the will of the parties. 32 In these cases, the legislator 
has considered the point to be of minor importance, because it was 
not endangering the established order. Some freedom could be left 
to the parties to create their own law within the limits determined 
by the suppletory provisions. 
THE INSTITUTIONS 
Within the broad field hedged by the imprecise contours of the 
captions of the books, the drafters of the code intended to fit a 
group of well-defined institutions linked together by the simple 
23 A third element could be added to this twofold classification to include 
what one might call "transitional provisions." In this category we would place 
articles such as La. Civil Code arts. 1995, 2668 (1870). Such articles do not add 
to the substance of the law, they neither order, permit, nor forbid; they simply 
make easier and more pleasant the reading of the Code. These articles have no 
equivalents in the Code Civil. This third element has been added at the sugges­
tion of Mr. Gary Theall, whose cooperation and advice have been very helpful 
to me. 
24 La. Civil Code art. 2 (1870): 
[Law] orders and permits and forbids, it annou.nces rewar�s and 
punishments, its provisions generall� relate not to sohta.ry and smgular 
cases but to what passes in the ordmary course of affairs. 
25 The present and future tenses of the verbs given are often equivalent to 
an obligation. See, e.g., La. Civil Code arts. 2509 (present), 203-205 (future). 
20 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 2315 (1870). 
21 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 2489 (1870). 
28 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 645 (1870). 
29 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 19 (1870). 
ao E.g., La. Civil Code art. 5 (1870). 
31 E.g., La. Civil Code arts. 2316, 2317 (1870). 
s2 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 2461 (1870). 
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thread of the necessity of a total organization. These institutions 
have been identified by one word or one short heading that cor­
responds to the captions of the different titles. Each single institu­
tion has been analyzed as a whole within the title of which it 
forms the substance (e.g., Of Domicile, Of Absentees, Of Husband 
and Wife) . The analysis of the institution leads to a listing of its 
elements either in chapters (whenever the title consists of one 
institution only) or in sections (whenever several institutions are 
grouped within one title, each institution subsequently becoming 
the caption of a chapter). The purpose o f  such systematic con­
struction in the titles, chapters and sections was to create an in­
tellectual mechanism that would inevitably and necessarily guide 
the lawyer toward an awareness of the existence of a fixed rapport 
between all the elements of each institution. The intended result 
is that, for example, whenever the word "sale" is mentioned, it 
brings to one's mind not only the definition of sale but also all the 
elements of "a sale," such as risk of the thing, or obligations of 
the parties. All these elements are necessary parts of a coherent 
and solidary whole, which is the institution. Such a "whole" could 
easily be compared to a chemical product that could not be achieved 
if any one of its components were missing. Furthermore, any 
extraneous element would spoil the product wanted, ruin it or 
result in something else. Thus, a judge or any interpreter of the 
law must necessarily distinguish between those elements required 
by the law and those that would be outside its scope. In a codified 
system of law, whatever is not explicitly laid down in the articles 
will of necessity lie in the domain of uncertainty and controversy. 
A s  an illustration of the truth of this statement, it is enough to 
recall that the actio de in rem verso, because it it not explicitly 
stated in the code, still divides the doctrine on its very existence, 
to say nothing of its elements.sa 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
Although we have insisted on the fact that each institution must 
be conside�ed as a whole and each title as an entity, we are by no 
�ea?s �aymg �at the code consists of a simple juxtaposition of 
msbtubons foreign to one another. It is there that the concept of 
"code" and the spirit that pervades it emerge to provide the intel­
lectual mechanis� that is like the framework of a building, the 
w�ess �f which would cause the building to fall. This mech­
anism consists mainly in the methods of reasoning (which we shall 
not expound here because the depth of the topic is incompatible 
p :; �m;nent,43ATulctio De In Rem Verso in Louisiana: Min110trd 11. Curtis 
,. "C • no., L. Rev. 263 (1969). 
1970] CIVILIAN METHODOLOGY 701 
with the limits of this article34) and, secondarily, in the notions of 
interdependence between the articles. This interdependence exists 
on two levels : between the code articles as such and between the 
articles that define an institution and those defining another insti­
tution. 
The demonstration of the close interdependence between two 
or more consecutive articles need not be long to be convincing. 
Broadly speaking, a code article is composed of two elements. The 
first could be dubbed the "hypothesis ;" the second would then be 
the "solution." For example, in article 57 the hypothesis is, 
"[w]hen a person shall not have appeared at the place of his 
domicile or habitual residence, and when such person shall not 
have been heard of, for five years . . . •  " When such a situation 
exists, the solution is that "his presumptive heirs may .... "35 In 
article 1893 the hypothesis laid down consists in "[a] n obligation 
without a cause, or with a false or unlawful cause," and the solu­
tion is that it "can have no effect."36 Furthermore, an article may 
have as its hypothesis another article. For example, article 223 is 
the hypothesis of the solution given in article 224; article 1901 has 
article 1779 as its hypothesis.37 These examples show that the rules 
of law cannot be separated one from the other, that they are linked 
and interwoven so as to support one another. 
The second level of interdependence appears with the institu­
tions contained in the code. A careful reading of the preparatory 
works for the French Civil Code will convince the reader that the 
drafters meant to organize the different institutions strictly and 
at the same time to reach a precise correspondence between the 
headings and the provisions they encompass.38 However, the use of 
84 See, e.g., C. J. Morrow quoted in accompanying article by Judge Tate at 44 Tul. L. Rev. 675 (1970). [Ed.] 
35 La. Civil Code art. 57 (1870). 
30 La. Civil Code art. 1893 (1870). 
87 La. Civil Code art. 223 (1870) : 
Fathers and mothers shall have, during marriage, the enjoyment of 
the estate of their children until their majority or emancipation. 
La. Civil Code art. 224 (1870): 
The obligations resulting from this enjoyment shall be: 1. The same 
obligations to which usufructuaries are subjected; 2. To support, to 
maintain and to educate their children according to their situation in 
life. 
La. Civil Code art. 1779 (1870): 
Four requisites are necessary to the validity of a contract: 1. Parties 
legally capable of contracting. 2. Their consent legally given. 3. A certain 
object, which forms the matter of agreement. 4 .  A lawful purpose. 
La. Civil Code art. 1901 (1870): 
Agreements legally entered into have the e:ffect of laws on those who 
have formed them. 
They can not be revoked, unless by mutual consent of the parties, or 
for causes acknowledged by law. 
They must be performed with good faith. 
as See 13 Fenet, supra note 2, at 121, 145; 14 Fenet at 440. 
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these separate headings did not carry with it the partitioning of 
the institutions. They cannot be relied on so as to exclude one 
another or oppose one another. Article 21939 of the Louisiana Code 
would suffice to support such a statement, but article 243840 
also provides clear illustration of this interdependence between two 
institutions. But there is, in this case and in several others, another 
reason for this interdependence: it is the existence of a rapport 
between the "general" and the "particular." The contract of sale 
is but a particular kind of "conventional obligations." Some less 
conspicuous rapport exists in the code between institutions, and 
it can even happen that the "particular" precedes the "general." 
This may sound aberrant at first hand, but when one thinks about 
it, it simply testifies that the civil code is but "one law" with so 
many articles which had to be organized one way or another. One 
example is that of Titles II and III o f  Book III. Title II reads "Of 
Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa;" article 1468 reads, "A 
donation inter vivos (between living persons) is an act by which 
the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing 
given, in favor of the donee who accepts it."41 Bringing this article 
together with article 176142 of Title III will necessarily lead one to 
the conclusion that a donation inter vivos is a "particular" element 
of the general category of "conventional obligations." The reason is 
that donation inter vivos is also a "particular" item in another 
general category which is defined by article 1467 as being a "gratu­
itous transfer of property."43 These examples are simple evidence 
of the fact that the heading should not be given a decisive legal 
authority, excluding any provision which pertains to another 
institution. The headings help the lawyer to find his way through 
the code, but the interpreter that he is should not be misled.44 "One 
39 La. Civil Code art. 219 (1870): 
. The fath�r �nd mo�her have a right to apjoint tutors to their chtldre�, a� is directed m the title: Of Minors o their Tutorship and Emancipation. ' 
•o La. Civil Code art. 2438 (1870): 
. In all cases, where no special provision is made under the present title, the c�ntract of sale is subjected to the general rules established under the title: 0/ Conventional Obligations 41 La. C� l Code art. 1468 (1870), as amended La. Acts 1871 No. 87. 42 La. ClVll Co�e art. 1761 (1870): ' ' 
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must admit that the provisions that each [heading] encompasses 
are mainly related to the subject defined by such heading. But, 
one must not forget that law is not a theoretical manual, that every 
legal provision must be considered in itself as well as in its relations 
with those that precede it or �hat follow it."411 
CONCLUSION 
The civil code appears through these short remarks as the work 
of real architects. Quite understandably, its look and its shape have 
not attracted the jurists so much as has the substance of its pro­
visions. Nevertheless, the drafters of the civil codes have proved 
themselves to be "legal" technicians to the point of paying the ut­
most attention to the problems of organization and composition of 
the articles. The civil code presents itself as an a priori impossible 
combination of two diametrically opposed trends: one is systema­
tization, the other is parceling out. Indeed, any one of the code 
articles can be taken out with its number, which is like a name to 
identify and individualize it, to serve as the basis for a court's de­
cision. An article will be the basis of a lawyer's brief and may be 
challenged by another article that will serve as the cornerstone of 
the opponent's brief. It will be up t o  the judge to gather the pieces 
together and reconcile the code articles in order to achieve the 
systematization that was the goal of the drafters of the code. The 
civil code is one and only one law; it is a whole built on "n" arti­
cles, each essential t o  the whole. "The civil code is a well ordered 
monument, whose design and outlooks have a meaning. Beyond this 
apparent arrangement, there exist implicit and changing coordina­
tions, a deep life, hidden feelings and conceptions which are the 
true cement of the legal provisions."46 
45 C. Brocher, :Etude sur Jes Principles Generaux de !'Interpretation des 
Lois et Specialement du Code Napoleon 67 (1870) (author's translation). 
46 J. Ray, Essai sur la Structure Logique du Code Civil Fran�ais (1926) 
(author's translation). This work was the main source of our documentat ion 
and we largely relied on it. 
